Eric Maskin
American Nobel laureate in economics
The numbers
2 + 1 = 3
Lo Shu grid
Missing: 4, 6, 7, 8. Present digits repeat to show how many times they occur.
Life path 3 — The Communicator
Three is the number of expression — the point at which a thing becomes shareable. Tradition links it to language, humour, performance and the ability to make an idea land. It is generally read as the most immediately likeable number, and the reading usually adds a warning in the same breath: fluency can outrun substance, and 3 is described as capable of talking its way past work it has not actually done.
Complete lines
Line of Expression
A complete line in the grid.
Line of Resolve
The 1-5-9 diagonal complete. Read as determination that survives the middle of a project, when the initial energy has gone and the result is not yet visible.
Repeated numbers
1 appears 4 times
Concentrated self-direction. Read as conviction that does not need external agreement — and does not always seek it.
2 appears 3 times
Concentrated sensitivity. Read as perception so continuous it becomes hard to switch off.
What is missing
Missing 4
Read as impatience with structure and maintenance. Associated with starting well and leaving the scaffolding to someone else.
Missing 6
Read as a complicated relationship with obligation — either avoiding it or over-shouldering it, rarely a settled middle.
Missing 7
Read as reluctance to sit with an unresolved question. Associated with wanting the working answer rather than the true one.
Missing 8
Read as discomfort with power and money — not incapacity, but an unwillingness to claim authority openly.
Vedic — Ank Jyotish
Moolank 3 comes from the day of the month alone; Bhagyank 3 from the whole date. They coincide here, which happens for about 11% of this database and is read as root and destiny pointing the same way.
Guru
Jupiter. Expansion, teaching, counsel. Read as the most benefic assignment in the set.
Bhagyank uses the same arithmetic as the Western life path, so the two will always agree. That is not two traditions confirming each other — it is one calculation under two names.
In their words
That strategic rivalry in a long-term relationship may differ from that of a one-shot game is by now quite a familiar idea. Repeated play allows players to respond to each other's actions, and so each player must consider the reactions of his opponents in making his decision. The fear of retaliation may thus lead to outcomes that otherwise would not occur. The most dramatic expression of this phenomenon is the celebrated "Folk Theorem." An outcome that Pareto dominates the minimax point is called individually rational. The Folk Theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a in infinitely repeated games with sufficiently little discounting.
We investigate how the degree to which credit markets are centralized affects efficiency when there is asymmetric information. Specifically, we argue that decentralization of credit may promote efficient project selection when creditors are not fully informed ex ante about project quality. Our starting point is the idea that, although an entrepreneur (project manager) may have a relatively good idea of her project's quality from the outset, creditors acquire this information only later on, by which time the criteria for profitability may have changed. Thus, a poor project (one whose completion time is too long to be profitable ex ante) may nevertheless be financed, since a creditor cannot distinguish it at the time from a good (quick) project.
After society has decided on a social choice rule-a recipe for choosing the optimal social alternative (or alternatives) on the basis of individuals' preferences over the set of all social alternatives-the social planner still faces the problem of how to implement that rule. In particular, the planner may not know individuals' preferences. He might attempt to elicit them, but this may not be an easy task, even abstracting from communication costs. If individuals know the rule by which the planner selects alternatives on the basis of reported preferences, they may have an incentive to report falsely.
How could such industries as software, semiconductors, and computers have been so innovative despite historically weak patent protection? We argue that if innovation is both sequential and complementary—as it certainly has been in those industries—competition can increase firms' future profits thus offsetting short-term dissipation of rents. A simple model also shows that in such a dynamic industry, patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare. The natural experiment that occurred when patent protection was extended to software in the 1980's provides a test of this model. Standard arguments would predict that R&D intensity and productivity should have increased among patenting firms.
It's true that my initial training was in mathematics. However, almost by accident, I happened to take a course from Kenneth Arrow on "Information Economics," which was so inspiring that I decided to change direction. It seemed to me that economics combined the best of both worlds: the rigor of mathematics with the immediate relevance of a social science. As for how much math I would recommend, I'd say that basic analysis, including , is certainly very useful. Also, and always helps. But beyond that, I don't think a huge mathematical investment is necessary to do economic theory unless you are planning to work in an extremely technical area.
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